Legalization of international economic relations: is Asia unique? by Hamanaka Shintaro
Legalization of international economic
relations: is Asia unique?
著者 Hamanaka Shintaro
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 681
year 2017-12
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00049793
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Legalization, International economic law, ASEAN way, Asian regionalism, 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)  
 
JEL classification: F15, F53, F55 
  
*   Research Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO). Corresponding author 
(Shintaro_Hamanaka@ide.go.jp).  
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 681 
Legalization of International 
Economic Relations:  
Is Asia Unique? 
Shintaro Hamanaka*  
December 2017 
Abstract  
The concept of “legalization” developed by international relations theorists in the early 
2000s seems to be very useful in analyzing the development of international laws. 
Legalization is a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three aspects: 
obligation, precision, and delegation. While earlier studies tend to simply argue that 
Asian institutions are less legalized than their Western counterparts, such a simplistic 
argument may need some revisions. Because there are already many bilateral and 
regional agreements in Asia that attempt to facilitate economic integration, it is very 
timely to re-examine the state of play of legalization of Asian economic relations. 
There is a possibility that Asian institutions are now legalized in terms of one or two 
aspects of legalization, but not all.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2016 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Legalization of International Economic Relations  
 
Is Asia Unique?  
 
 
 
 
 
Shintaro Hamanaka 
 
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)  
 
 
December, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The concept of “legalization” developed by international relations theorists in the early 
2000s seems to be very useful in analyzing the development of international laws. 
Legalization is a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three aspects: 
obligation, precision, and delegation. While earlier studies tend to simply argue that Asian 
institutions are less legalized than their Western counterparts, such a simplistic argument 
may need some revisions. Because there are already many bilateral and regional 
agreements in Asia that attempt to facilitate economic integration, it is very timely to re-
examine the state of play of legalization of Asian economic relations. There is a possibility 
that Asian institutions are now legalized in terms of one or two aspects of legalization, 
but not all.  
 
 
Keywords: Legalization, International economic law, ASEAN way, Asian regionalism, 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM)  
 
  
2 
 
Introduction  
 
It is not easy to conduct a theoretically informed comparative study of de jure economic 
integration, namely, economic integration in terms institutional development. Therefore, 
we tend to have a simplistic argument that economic relations in Europe are more 
institutionalized or legalized than those in Asia, which has adopted an “informal” 
approach, without further elaboration. As a result, Asian scholars and policy makers are 
often preoccupied to learn lessons from Europe and to contemplate what Asia should do 
to achieve a comparable level of institutionalization or legalization as Europe. 
Alternatively, Asian elites simply argue that Asia is very different from Europe and it 
should pursue its own way of regionalism without having careful reference to integration 
efforts in other regions. In essence, there is a lack of real comparative study of de jure 
economic integration across regions.  
 
One of the reasons for the lack of serious attempt of comparative study is limited scholarly 
interactions between international economic lawyers and international relations experts 
(Burley 1993). International economic lawyers tend to focus on the interpretation of rules 
on a case by case basis, without too much generalization, such as the European or Asian 
way of setting international rules. International relations theorists, in contrast, are 
preoccupied in identifying the causes of institutionalization (conditions under which 
international relations are institutionalized), without paying large attention to differences 
in institutional design. In addition, area study experts (e.g., European studies experts in 
Asia) who are interested in comparative regionalism studies seem to keep some distance 
from disciplinary studies such as laws and international relations, which resulted in 
another knowledge gap, the one between area studies and disciplinary studies.  
 
However, several important theoretical works that look into the legal aspects of 
institutions have been conducted by international relations theorists since 2000. One area 
of research that achieved remarkable theoretical development is the “legalization of 
institutions.” While earlier studies do not clearly distinguish the difference between the 
two terms (institutionalization and legalization), and often use them interchangeably, 
Abbott et al. (2000) define legalization as a particular form of institutionalization 
characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation. Political 
scientists are now studying specific questions regarding the legalization of institutions, 
such as the impact of flexible languages (Linos and Pegram 20161 ) and the form of 
delegation of power (Duina 20162).  
 
This paper asks a very simple but important question: Is Asia unique in terms of the 
legalization of economic relations? I try to answer this question by reviewing the 
legalization of ASEAN trade liberalization. The paper mainly discusses the liberalization 
of goods trade and dispute settlement mechanisms, but it also touches upon services trade 
                                                        
1 Linos and Pegram (2016) argue that flexible languages in treaties often have unexpected impacts on state 
behaviors. When an agreement specifies some tasks firmly and provisions on other expected tasks include 
flexible languages, governments may respond by strategically redirecting efforts toward firmly specified 
tasks.  
2 Duina (2016) argues that the delegation of power takes different form between FTAs among civil law 
countries and those among common-law countries. The former prefer a permanent court to solve disputes 
while the latter prefer an ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism.  
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liberalization in ASEAN3. While past influential studies argue that international relations 
in Asia are less legalized, implying that rules are imprecise and non-binding and Asian 
countries are reluctant to delegate power (Kahler 20004 ), such an observation needs 
careful re-examination given the number of economic agreements signed in Asia since 
the early 2000. We should also not rule out the possibility that Asia has a distinct approach 
to legalization that is different from Europe or elsewhere. Moreover, it is important to ask 
which aspects of legalization (precision, binding-ness, or delegation) has been most 
developed in Asia because there is a possibility that Asian institutions are legalized in 
terms of one or two aspects of legalization, but not all. 
 
The next section reviews the development of international relations theories on 
institutions and explains the studies on legalization of institutions in detail. Section 3 
discusses ASEAN countries’ attitudes toward precision and binding-ness in developing 
international rules or commitments. Section 4 discusses the third aspect of legalization, 
namely, the delegation of power. In addition to the arrangement of delegating power, it 
discusses the actual exercise of delegated power. The final section concludes and attempts 
to answer the question whether Asia is unique.  
 
Review of Theories: From Regime to Legalized Institution  
 
There was a rise of regionalism in the 1960s, which was triggered by the launch of the 
European Commission in 1957 (Mansfield and Milner 2003). Naturally, scholars started 
to analyze the interesting development of regionalism and some comparative analyses 
were conducted. The focus then was on the organization, which is an inter-state 
association with some physical body such as a permanent secretariat. In fact, Nye (1968) 
states that “regionalism in the descriptive sense is the formation of inter-state associations 
or groupings on the basis of regions and, in the doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such 
formations.” Interestingly, one of the leading journals of international relations, 
International Organization, was launched in 1947.  
 
International relations scholars started to think that the focus of analysis is too narrow if 
they stick to the concept of organizations. Krasner (1982) started to use the term “regime,” 
which refers to a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.” The scope was widened, to capture various mechanisms that affect state 
behaviors, going beyond written rules and formal organizations. Moreover, an emphasis 
was placed on regimes, which are the accumulation or networks of various mechanisms, 
such as a security regime (Jervis 1982) and a human rights regime (Donnelly 1986). 
However, the concept of regime is so broad that it is often difficult to conduct an 
empirically sound analysis (Haggard and Simmons 1987).  
                                                        
3 Investment is another important area where international economic relations are legalized. However, we 
will not discuss investment in this paper because the legalization of investment relations deeply involves 
private entities, such as investor–state disputes, which makes the nature of delegation of power very 
different from the case of trade. For the legalization of international investment relations, see Salacuse 
(2007).  
4 Interestingly, Kahler argues that economic cooperation is one of areas that achieve a relatively high level 
of legalization, unlike security. Note, however, that many international economic lawyers are of the view 
that economic cooperation in Asia is poorly legalized the signing of FTAs. See Davidson (2000) and Ewing-
Chow (2008).  
4 
 
 
After this, the literature developed in two ways. A first group of scholars conducted 
analyses on international norms. While norms are included in the concept of “regime” 
because they affect state behaviors, their treatment was marginal in empirical studies 
because a positive analysis of norms is difficult, i.e., norms are often unwritten. 
Finnemore and Toope, who belong to this group of scholars, heavily criticize legalization 
literature (see below) that intends to contribute to “positive” empirical studies, on the 
grounds that the concept of legalization is vast and summarizing it into a limited number 
of “variables” misses the point (Finnemore and Toope 2001).  
 
What is interesting is that literature on regional institutions that emphasizes the role of 
norms has developed in the context of Asian regionalism. This is particularly evident in a 
study on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose institutionalization 
started more than a half-century ago. For example, Acharya (1997) dubbed the 
institutionalization of cooperation in Southeast Asia as the “ASEAN way.” It is very 
interesting to note that several key words to describe ASEAN way use somewhat 
contradictory terms. “Flexible consensus” means that decision making is based on 
consensus, which does not necessarily require the consent of all parties. Proponents of 
the ASEAN way distinguish consensus and unanimity. Consultations to reach flexible 
consensus are held at “informal official” meetings. Such a meeting is not an unofficial 
meeting. What is agreed as a result of such consultations becomes “non-binding 
commitment.” Countries need to implement commitments, but non-fulfillment does not 
lead to punishment. Above all, the overarching attitude of ASEAN negotiations can be 
said to be “agree to disagree” (Puig and Tat 2015).  
 
Other scholars return to the analysis of organizations. The paper by Abbott and Snidal 
(1998) that tackles the question “why states act through formal international organizations” 
(emphasis added) is one of illustrative examples. It is important to note that theorists start 
to make a conscious effort to develop concepts that are useful for empirical studies. So-
called “rational” institutional design projects (Koremenos et al. 2001) have made a very 
important contribution in this regard. They argue that institutions have five key 
institutional features (membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, 
rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements), from which angle 
sound empirical studies, including comparative studies, of international institutions can 
be conducted.  
 
It was in this context that the concept of legalization of institutions was developed by 
Abbott et al. (2000). Legalization is a particular set of characteristics that institutions may 
possess, i.e., obligations, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states or other 
actors are legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior 
thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of 
international laws. Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they 
require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been granted the 
authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules and to resolve disputes. While there 
has been a criticism that legalization is only one aspect of institutionalization, ignoring 
other important institutional features (Finnemore and Toope 2001), there seems to be a 
wide consensus that the concept is useful for empirical studies (Goldstein et al. 2001).  
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Whether rules or commitments are hard or soft has been one of the principal concerns 
among scholars studying international relations. When rule and commitments satisfy the 
three conditions of legalization (obligation, precision, and delegation), they can be 
regarded as hard law or highly legalized institutions. When one or more aspects of 
legalization are insubstantial, such can be called as soft law. There would be an extreme 
argument by neo-realists that even precise and binding rules do have little impact on states’ 
behavior. However, for many, when obligations are binding and precise, they are likely 
to have a large influence on states’ behavior. In other words, there is an assumption that 
“the harder, the better” regarding international rules. Many arguments that support the 
value of soft law actually take it for granted that hard law is the very best solution and 
that soft law is the second best. Because agreeing upon hard legalization is difficult due 
to sovereignty cost, states compromise and accept soft legalization, with some actors 
holding an expectation that institutions would be more legalized in future. Probably, the 
only factor that would make soft legalizations superior to hard ones is “uncertainty” 
(Abbott et al. 2000, 441) 5 . Because what will happen in future is uncertain, a soft 
approach that has ambiguous and broad scope is better at governing state behaviors. 
Institutions or rules that are too hard tend to be broken down or outdated easily when 
something unexpected occurs. 
 
Likewise, delegation of power is to make international rules hard. As one can imagine, 
international relations tend to focus on “which country has more power.” 6  The 
legalization literature made very important contributions in this regard, because it shows 
the possibility wherein power is delegated to a third party, not to other states. With the 
concept of delegation of power, we can go beyond questioning which country has more 
power. Borrowing ideas from game theory, institutionalists (neo-liberal institutionalists) 
argue that institutions that prevent the prisoners’ dilemma situation are beneficial to all 
members. Institutionalists emphasize the importance of the mechanism that guarantees 
cooperation, such as monitoring, side payment and punishment (in the case of 
incompliance), whereas the legalization literature makes it very clear that power 
delegated to such a mechanism that guarantees cooperation is the key to understanding 
the nature of institutions. 
 
Kahler (2000) examines Asian institutions such as ASEAN and Asia–Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), using the concept of legalization developed by Abbott et al. (2000). 
He convincingly concludes that Asian institutions are less legalized from the angle of all 
three aspects and asks why such is the case. He carefully examines two possibilities: the 
legal culture in Asia and authoritarian domestic regimes. He argues that Asia’s uniform 
rejection of legalization should have been persistent if legal culture or domestic regime is 
the reason. In reality, however, he finds that Asia’s attitude toward legalization is mixed, 
which implies that those constant factors do not explain why Asia often, but not always, 
prefers low level of legalization. In addition, regarding legal culture, he rejects such a 
possibility on the grounds that Asian states adopt the legalization approach in developing 
domestic legal institutions. Then, he argues that legalized institutions are a means to other 
                                                        
5 Some international economic lawyers are critical of soft laws as the proliferation of soft laws might 
destabilize the international system (Weil 1983). 
6 Power can be military power and essentially based on material capability. However, according to Nye 
(1991), there is soft power as well. Nonetheless, the question of soft power is which country has larger 
influence, which is essentially on the same paradigm as hard power. 
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ends and Asian countries adopt legalization only when that serves their goal, though an 
important question regarding the way in which Asia accepts legalization remains 
unanswered. 
 
The following sections discuss whether there is an Asian way of legalization of 
international economic relations and whether Asia has a distinctive approach to the 
legalization of institutions. First, we will analyze precision and binding-ness of rules 
together, because there may be a trade-off between the two aspects of legalization. Then, 
we will analyze the delegation of power. We will also discuss the exercise of delegated 
power, which is different from the delegation of power per se. 
 
Priority on Precision over Binding-ness: “Asian” Rules?  
 
Asian countries, including ASEAN Members, prefer adopting declarations or political 
statements. By looking at the website of ASEAN, one can find that it is full of declarations 
and political statements. Declarations and political statements are usually non-binding 
and imprecise—they are hardly hard law. Another interesting phenomenon is that ASEAN 
likes to sign framework agreements that may or may not be followed by the signing of 
detailed agreements. ASEAN’s project on trade liberalization starts with the signing of 
the Framework Agreement for Enhancing ASEAN economic Cooperation signed on 
January 28, 1992. Service liberalization projects are also conducted under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), signed in 1995. The Framework Agreement 
can be said to be a first step toward the legalization of international relations, because the 
signing of framework agreements is a manifestation of Members’ interests in developing 
legalized institutions.  
 
When economic liberalization commitments are legalized, ideally, rules or commitments 
should be both precise and binding. However, when precise and binding rules are too 
much, one of them should be prioritized. What is the case of ASEAN? It seems that 
ASEAN prioritizes precise commitment over binding commitment. In other words, 
ASEAN Members’ commitments tend to be precise but non-binding. 
 
There is no doubt that Asia and ASEAN start to have very precise rules with regard to 
economic liberalization commitments. Trade liberalization of ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) is precise enough: it is very clear that by when and which tariff line should reduce 
the tariff level to which level. ASEAN’s liberalization of services trade is also precise 
enough. The schedules of service liberalization commitments show the minimum level of 
liberalization that a Member shall maintain in the future. It is clear which sector and which 
mode of service supply are subject to which regulations.  
 
The “Temporary Exclusion List” used in the AFTA Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme is an illustrative example of ASEAN’s preference on precision over 
binding-ness. Article 1 of Protocol Regarding the Implementation of the CEPT Scheme 
Temporary Exclusion List signed in 2000 states:  
 
Article 1 Objective and Scope 
The objective of this Protocol is to allow a Member State to temporarily delay the 
transfer of a product from its [Temporary Exclusion List] TEL into the Inclusion List 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IL’), or to temporarily suspend its concession on a 
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product already transferred into the IL, if such a transfer or concession would cause 
or have caused real problems, by reasons which are not covered by Article 6 
(Emergency Measures) of the Agreement. 
 
Haggard (2011) notes that the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration 
argued for flexibility in meeting commitments, but at the same time proposed that 
commitments be more precise and transparent. In his observation, all commitments 
undertook by ASEAN Members are precise, but there is differentiation in terms of the 
timing of implementation across countries, including a possibility of a temporary opt-out. 
There is even a possibility of a perpetual opt-out based on “ASEAN minus X” formula. 
This is in line with ASEAN’s original idea of a Temporary Exclusion List introduced in 
CEPT scheme. The idea is to make the commitments non-binding for a temporary period 
and not to make them imprecise.  
 
The negotiation position of ASEAN at the multilateral services trade negotiations also 
suggests ASEAN’s preference to precision over binding-ness. At the World Trade 
organization (WTO) Doha round services trade negotiations, ASEAN Members insisted 
upon the creation of new rules on Emergency Safeguard Measures (ESM) so that they 
can submit ambitious services liberalization commitments, which are precise in nature. 
This is because, with the system of ESM, WTO Members can be exempted from the 
liberalization commitments when something unexpected happens. ASEAN countries that 
had experienced the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8 are strong proponents of EMS 
because, for example, ASEAN’s commitment of financial services liberalization can be 
suspended if another financial crisis hits the region and EMS is in place. It should be 
noted that WTO services trade liberalization follows the so-called “positive list” approach, 
wherein liberalization is required only in the sectors that each Member agrees to liberalize. 
While ASEAN Members have an option to take advantage of this rule by offering poor-
quality commitments rather than requesting the ESM, they decided to insist upon the new 
rules on EMS, which enables them to submit ambitious offers. In short, ASEAN wants to 
relax the binding-ness of WTO services trade liberalization commitments while keeping 
them precise. 
 
Then, the question is why precision is prioritized over binding-ness. There are two 
possible explanations. First, because methodology of the commitment is globally 
standardized, Asia should follow it. Asian countries do not have room to make imprecise 
commitments because of globally harmonized way of liberalization. This is especially 
true for Asian countries’ commitment under WTO, but this is also true for commitments 
under Asian FTAs that often follow globally standardized format. The second possibility 
is that the level of binding-ness can be adjusted relatively easily, even after the 
enforcement of rules. In contrast, reducing the precision of text involves additional 
negotiations to agree upon new set of ambiguous languages and commitments, which is 
time consuming.  
 
Delegation of Power and the Exercise of Delegated Power  
 
The first protocol on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) of ASEAN was signed 
in 1996 (1996 Protocol); however, this was never invoked due to its excessively 
bureaucratic nature (Puig and Tat 2015, 282). Based on Abbott et al. (2001), Davidson 
(2004) reviews the legalization of economic cooperation among ASEAN achieved by the 
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early 2000s. While he acknowledges the growing momentum of delegation of power, he 
concludes that delegation is the most difficult aspect of legalization in ASEAN economic 
relations because of the norm of the “ASEAN way.”  
 
The institutional design of ASEAN services trade liberalizations also implies that 
delegation is the lowest priority in ASEAN. As discussed, at the WTO services trade 
negotiations, ASEAN Members are the proponents of EMS, which reduces the binding-
ness of commitments. However, ASEAN’s regional services trade liberalization called 
AFAS does not have EMS. This is perhaps partly because ASEAN Members are unlikely 
to exercise delegated power even if power is delegated (for further discussion on the 
exercise of delegated power, see the next section). As long as the initiation of a dispute 
settlement mechanism is unlikely, ASEAN Members accept not only precise, but also 
binding commitments. Because this assumption does not hold for the case of WTO 
services trade liberalization (once power is delegated, Westerns countries are likely to 
exercise it) , ASEAN needs to insist upon the EMS. Hence, we can say that the delegation 
of power is the lowest priority of legalization in ASEAN services trade liberalization. 
 
However, there seems to be a growing consensus that the dispute settlement mechanism 
in ASEAN or ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is comparable with other FTAs. In 
2004, ASEAN adopted the Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (2004 
Protocol), which establishes a near rule-based Dispute Settlement Mechanism for AFTA 
(Puig and Tat 2015). Does this mean that ASEAN’s economic relations are fully legalized 
in terms of all of three aspects, namely, precision, binding-ness and the delegation of 
power? To tackle this question, it seems helpful to distinguish the two questions below:  
 
(i) whether states delegate power to dispute settlement mechanisms and 
(ii) whether power delegated to dispute settlement mechanisms are actually exercised.  
 
Voeten (2010) argues that in general, countries are not keen to use a dispute settlement 
mechanism and attempt to solve problems diplomatically through consultation and 
consensus. Such an attitude is not unique in Asia and many non-Asian countries also solve 
problems without using a dispute settlement mechanism. However, it should be noted that 
what he finds was that there is no evidence that Asian countries are less likely than other 
states to refer trade, investment, or territorial disputes to a dispute settlement mechanism 
at the global level, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (emphasis added).  
 
Then, the real question is why ASEAN countries refrain from using the ASEAN Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism against fellow ASEAN states, despite the fact that they initiate the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings as frequently as other states. Articles 26 and 27 of 
the ASEAN Charter, which came into force on December 15, 2008, give us some idea on 
this problem:  
 
Article 26 Unresolved Disputes  
When a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding provisions 
of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision. 
 
Article 27 Compliance  
2. Any Member State affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations 
or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the 
matter to the ASEAN Summit for a decision. 
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While ASEAN trade dispute settlement mechanism developed to a certain degree, 
ASEAN is essentially an institution that solves problems through consultation and 
consensus. The ASEAN Charter anticipates that if disputes remain unresolved, then the 
dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, which is very likely to follow 
consultation and consensus rather than majority voting (Ewing-Chow 2008, 230). 
 
In this regard, the difference between Asian countries and others is not negligible. As 
Kahler (2000) argues, non-Asian countries also solve problems outside legalized 
institutions. Nevertheless, the difference between the two should be emphasized. Asian 
countries are more explicit in accepting the fact that legal solutions have limitations and 
it is diplomatic efforts that ultimately solve legal problems. In contrast, Westerners focus 
on tightening the loopholes of legalized institutions to make them as “perfect” as possible. 
While Asians formally accept informal ways of solving problems, it seems that 
Westerners only informally accept the fact that an informal way is necessary to solve 
disputes. 
 
Why, then, do Asians formally accept the informal way? In answering this question, we 
should remember that ASEAN started as an institution that mainly focuses on security 
issues. Even after ASEAN developed new rules and procedures to handle new issues such 
as trade and environment, the underlying norms developed during early era, such as non-
interference and consultation and consensus are still present. Because the enforcement of 
new specific rules is constrained by the meta-regime that is based on old norms and values, 
they do not function as expected (Aggarwal and Chow 2016). The ASEAN way is 
effective in solving security problems or effective in putting sensitive security problems 
in the shelf. One could argue that security and trade issues are totally different in terms 
of dispute settlement because the latter deals with more time-sensitive problems that have 
huge commercial implications and the ASEAN way is not effective in solving those 
immediate disputes at hand (Puig and Tat 20157). At the same time, one could also argue 
that everything is related to security and this is especially true for ASEAN, where the 
concept of “non-traditional” security issues is widely accepted (Tan and Boutin 2001).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Legalization is a particular form of institutionalization characterized by three aspects: 
obligation, precision, and delegation. During the last two decades, international economic 
relations among ASEAN Members have experienced the substantial process of 
legalization. While earlier studies tend to conclude that the legalization of economic 
liberalization in ASEAN was insubstantial in terms of all of the three aspects of 
legalizations, it is timely to re-examine this due to the progress of de jure economic 
integration in ASEAN and Asia.  
 
It seems that the liberalization commitments of ASEAN trade liberalization are as precise 
as liberalization elsewhere. Because the “template” of liberalization has been globally 
standardized, ASEAN needs to follow it. The binding-ness of rules is also acceptable to 
                                                        
7 Due to the fact that ASEAN Dispute Settlement has never been used to solve a trade dispute demonstrates 
the clear limitations of the ASEAN way. Puig and Tat (2015, 298) suggest the arbitration model for trade 
dispute settlement in ASEAN.  
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ASEAN. Only when the exercise of delegated power is likely does ASEAN try to keep 
rules non-binding. EMS under the WTO services trade negotiation is one illustrative 
example of this. Other than this scenario, ASEAN usually accepts precise and binding 
rules. The most difficult part of legalization in ASEAN is the delegation of power. Even 
if ASEAN Members agree to delegate power, there is an implicit understanding that trade 
disputes should be ultimately solved diplomatically outside the legalized system. In fact, 
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism has never been used, despite the fact that 
ASEAN’s use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is as frequent as other states. 
Thus, the situation is ironical: only when ASEAN Members agree not to use legal 
mechanism can they agree upon the establishment of such a legal mechanism. This does 
not, of course, mean that legalization in ASEAN is of no value. As long as disputes are 
not too critical to national interests, they are likely to be solved legally. 
 
The difference between Asia, or ASEAN, and the Western world in terms of legalization 
is substantial. While Asians formally accept informal way of solving problems, it seems 
Westerners only informally accept the fact that the informal way is necessary to solve 
problems. One plausible explanation why ASEAN make it explicit that non-legal method 
should be always on the table is that ASEAN is essentially a security institution that tries 
to solve problems in amicable way and the implication of trade dispute to security is not 
negligible. ASEAN does not deny the value of legalization, but explicitly keeping the 
option of non-legal solution is the prerequisite to legalization. In order not to over-write 
the solution suggested by legalized institutions by last-minute diplomatic negotiations, 
legal and diplomatic methods are always hand-in-hand in ASEAN economic cooperation. 
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